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Ingvar (1979, p. 21) theorized that memory 
plays a key role in allowing individuals to 
construct “alternative hypothetical behavior 
patterns in order to be ready for what may 
happen,” a process that he characterized as a 
“simulation of behavior”. Several years later, 
Ingvar elaborated these ideas by observing 
that “concepts about the future, like mem-
ories of past events, can be remembered, 
often in great detail” (Ingvar, 1985, p. 128), 
and that such “memories of the future” may 
offer important insights into the adaptive 
nature of human cognition. For instance, 
although the ability to simulate alternative 
versions of the future can benefit behavior, 
at least part of the adaptive advantage of 
future thinking may depend on the abil-
ity to remember the contents of simulated 
events (for discussion, see Suddendorf 
and Corballis, 1997, 2007; Szpunar, 2010; 
Schacter, 2012; Schacter et al., 2012). As 
an example, enlisting mental simulations 
of the future to help determine the best 
approach for resolving a conflict at home 
or in the workplace may confer few advan-
tages if the outcome of the simulation 
process is not remembered at the time the 
simulated behavior is executed. Although 
much research exists concerning prospec-
tive memory – remembering to carry out 
future intentions (e.g., Kliegel et al., 2008; 
see also Brewer and Marsh, 2009) – there is a 
striking lack of evidence concerning “mem-
ory of the future” in the sense discussed by 
Ingvar, that is, memory for the contents of 
future simulations. Recently, however, sev-
eral studies have provided the first glimpses 
into how well people remember details 
associated with simulated future events. In 
particular, these studies have demonstrated 
(1) enhanced memory for event details that 
are encoded with the future in mind, (2) 
factors that may influence the retention of 
simulated future events over extended time 
periods, and (3) neural correlates associated 
with encoding simulated future events. 
Next, we provide a brief overview of this 
emerging line of research, underscore the 
significance of various findings along with 
suggestions for future research directions, 
and conclude by discussing the relevance 
of this work to the concept of episodic 
memory. As we expand on below, it is our 
opinion that these new studies represent not 
only a useful extension of Ingvar’s (1979, 
1985) seminal observations, but that they 
also offer novel insights into the adaptive 
value of episodic memory.
Future-Oriented encOding 
PrOcesses enhance retentiOn
Klein et al. (2012, p. 240) have recently 
noted that systems of memory, includ-
ing episodic memory, may be “designed 
by evolution to interface with systems of 
long-term planning” (see also Suddendorf 
and Corballis, 2007). Accordingly, memory 
systems should be more efficient in dealing 
with encoding manipulations that encour-
age future-oriented processes such as plan-
ning than other well-established encoding 
manipulations that are not necessarily ori-
ented toward the future (e.g., imagery, self-
relevance; see also Klein et al., 2002; Klein 
et al., 2010; McDonough and Gallo, 2010). 
A recent line of research supports this pre-
diction. Klein et al. (2010) asked separate 
groups of participants to think about one of 
three camping scenarios: imagining a future 
camping trip, remembering a past camp-
ing trip, or imagining a typical   campsite 
without reference to the past or future. 
During the simulation/retrieval task, par-
ticipants were asked to indicate how likely 
it was that various items (e.g., tent, rope) 
were incorporated into their self-generated 
scenarios. After a brief delay, participants 
were presented with a blank sheet of paper 
and asked to recall the list of items asso-
ciated with the simulation/retrieval task. 
Participants who had simulated a future 
camping trip remembered more items than 
participants who had remembered a camp-
ing trip or simulated a typical campsite in 
an atemporal manner.
Notably,  Klein et al. (2010) included 
a fourth encoding condition that asked a 
separate group of participants to imagine 
a hypothetical camping scenario in which 
they were stranded in a forest, and to indi-
cate how likely it was that the same set 
of items (e.g., tent, rope) would enhance 
their chances of survival. This latter condi-
tion was included in response to a recent 
series of studies by Nairne and colleagues 
demonstrating that attending to the sur-
vival value of to-be-encoded information 
also enhances retention relative to other 
well-established encoding manipulations 
(for a review, see Nairne, 2010). Klein et al. 
(2010) hypothesized that survival process-
ing may enhance retention to the extent that 
it calls upon future-oriented processes such 
as planning. Along these lines, Klein et al. 
(2010) further suggested that the survival 
scenario might evoke planning in some par-
ticipants but not others; for instance, some 
participants may think about the survival 
scenario in an atemporal manner. Hence, 
while details associated with the survival 
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doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00047scenarios comprising people,   locations, 
and objects that had been extracted from 
autobiographical memories or participant-
generated lists. Memory for simulations 
was tested either shortly after simulation 
(20 min) or after an extended delay (24 h) 
by providing two elements of the simu-
lated episode (e.g., person and object) and 
probing for recall of the third element 
(e.g., location). Interestingly, more emo-
tional simulations (i.e., positive and nega-
tive events) were remembered than neutral 
simulations after the short delay, whereas 
more positive and neutral simulations were 
remembered than negative simulations after 
the long delay. That is, negative simulations 
were forgotten more quickly than positive 
and neutral simulations. This pattern of 
data may reflect the influence of fading 
affect bias (Walker and Skowronski, 2009), 
such that the affect that binds event details 
together (Mather and Sutherland, 2011) 
may dissipate more quickly for negative 
than positive events. Notably, Gallo et al. 
(2011) also found a positivity bias in mem-
ory for simulated future events after 24 h in 
young and old adults. Hence, the available 
data suggests that people may remember a 
rosy simulated future. Further studies of 
memory for simulated emotional events 
may thus have the potential to provide 
insights into various mood disorders such 
as anxiety and depression.
neural substrates FOr encOding 
simulatiOns OF Future events
So far, studies concerning “memory of the 
future” have focused mainly on cognitive 
processes. Although little is known about 
the neural processes that support encod-
ing of simulated future events, a recent 
study by Martin et al. (2011) indicates that 
the hippocampus plays an important role. 
During fMRI scanning, participants imag-
ined future scenarios comprising people, 
locations, and objects that were extracted 
from autobiographical memories. Memory 
for simulations was tested shortly after the 
scan by providing two elements of the simu-
lated episode (e.g., person and object) and 
probing for recall of the third element (e.g., 
location); a simulation was classified as 
“remembered” when participants recalled 
the third element correctly, and “forgotten” 
when they did not. Greater hippocampal 
activity was observed during construction 
of subsequently remembered than  forgotten 
scenario should be better remembered than 
details associated with scenarios that do not 
evoke planning (e.g., remembering a camp-
ing trip), details associated with the sur-
vival scenario should not be remembered 
as well as details associated with scenarios 
that always evoke planning (e.g., imagining 
a future camping trip). Klein et al. (2010) 
found support for both of these predictions. 
In a subsequent study, Klein et al. (2011) 
systematically varied the involvement of 
planning and survival processing in vari-
ous simulated scenarios, and found that 
participants were better able to remember 
details associated with scenarios that had 
evoked planning, whether or not survival 
processing was relevant, than details asso-
ciated with survival scenarios that had not 
evoked planning.
Nonetheless, some studies have failed 
to demonstrate a mnemonic advantage for 
encoding conditions that foster planning 
as compared to survival processing (e.g., 
Kang et al., 2008; Weinstein et al., 2008). 
In response to these incongruent findings, 
Klein et al. (2010, 2011) pointed out that 
enhanced memory for plans might depend 
on the extent to which plans evoke concepts 
of the personal future, such as planning for 
events that participants have experienced 
in the past and expect to experience again 
in the future. To test this claim, Klein et al. 
(2012) asked separate groups of partici-
pants to plan for familiar (e.g., dinner party) 
and unfamiliar (e.g., trip to Antarctica) sce-
narios. Participants who had made plans for 
familiar scenarios remembered more details 
associated with those scenarios than partici-
pants who had made plans for unfamiliar 
scenarios.
Hence, the available evidence suggests 
that people are rather adept at encoding and 
subsequently remembering details about 
simulated future events. We conclude this 
section by discussing a recent study demon-
strating how enhanced memory for details 
associated with future events can be used to 
help people distinguish between memories 
of the past and future. Earlier research on 
the relation between memory and imagi-
nation had demonstrated that memories 
and simulated events are best character-
ized by distinct phenomenological features: 
remembered events tend to be character-
ized by enhanced perceptual clarity whereas 
imagined events tend to be characterized 
by increased representation of cognitive 
operations (for a review, see Johnson, 
1988). Building on the results of Johnson 
and others, McDonough and Gallo (2010) 
found that people were able to make use of 
phenomenological characteristics such as 
perceptual clarity and cognitive operations 
when discriminating between memories 
of past and future events. Interestingly, the 
authors also found that the distinguishing 
characteristics of future events – cognitive 
operations – were more diagnostic in dis-
criminating between memories of past and 
future events than were the distinguishing 
characteristics of memories –   perceptual 
clarity. Accordingly, McDonough and 
Gallo (2010) noted that this latter pattern 
of results might reflect the workings of a 
memory system whose primary function 
involves “imagination and planning for 
future events” (p. 7).
In sum, the results of a number of studies 
have demonstrated that encoding manipu-
lations that encourage future-oriented pro-
cesses such as planning improve retention 
relative to other well-established encoding 
manipulations. Moving forward, studies 
that can identify the possible factors that 
underlie the mnemonic advantage associ-
ated with future-oriented encoding pro-
cesses, such as the role of familiarity and 
personal experience (Klein et al., 2012), will 
be of considerable interest. As an initial step 
in that direction, McLelland et al. (submit-
ted) identified several event characteristics 
that predicted the likelihood of successful 
encoding of future events. Imagined future 
events that were rated by participants as 
being more detailed, more plausible, and 
involving more familiar elements (in par-
ticular, events with more familiar people) 
were all significantly more likely to be later 
remembered than imagined events with low 
ratings on such characteristics.
retentiOn OF simulated Future 
events Over extended PeriOds
In the studies discussed thus far, memory 
for future simulations was tested after 
relatively brief study-test delays (usually 
5–20 min post simulation). Yet in the eve-
ryday situations discussed by Ingvar (1985), 
it may be necessary to retain a simulation 
over days and weeks. However, only two 
studies of which we are aware have exam-
ined memory for simulated future events at 
extended delays. In one study, Szpunar et al. 
(2012) asked participants to imagine future 
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simulations even when controlling for the 
amount of detail associated with each 
simulation (for discussion of related find-
ings, see Addis and Schacter, 2012; Schacter 
et al., 2012). Looking ahead, studies will be 
needed that can isolate the neural circuitry 
that underlies the mnemonic advantage 
produced by encoding information with 
the future in mind.
summary and cOnclusiOns
Over the last four decades, the concept of 
episodic memory has evolved into a mul-
tifaceted construct that is of great interest 
to researchers in various areas of psychol-
ogy and neuroscience (for recent over-
views, see Szpunar and McDermott, 2008; 
Tulving and Szpunar, 2009). Here, we have 
highlighted recent insights into an adaptive 
feature of episodic memory first noted by 
Ingvar (1985): “memories of the future,” like 
memories of past events, can help to guide 
behavior. Given the potential theoretical 
and practical importance of understanding 
memories of the future, it is perhaps sur-
prising that so little relevant   experimental 
work has been done. Developing a more 
in depth understanding of why simulated 
future events are well remembered, what 
factors influence the long-term retention 
of simulated future events, and how the 
brain supports the encoding of simulated 
future events, represent important avenues 
for future research that are likely to broaden 
our understanding of the utility of episodic 
memory in everyday life.
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